national will in the context of forming and executing national military strategy? I hope to banish the "specter" of Vietnam from matters of national military strategy, and offer a different opinion with respect to the public's role. To what extent can the American public influence or alter our national military strategy? The speed of information in the twenty-first century has affected how Americans voice their opinions, concerns, criticisms and support for the President and our elected leaders. Does this influence how our democratically elected officials and our military leaders interpret the collective national will of our nation? I will describe popular will as a subset of national will and present the actors that represent the "voice" of Americans. The effects of public opinion on national military strategy and policy are examined through political and military lenses. From this, conclusions will be drawn as to the effect of popular will on the decision to employ military power through the study of the 2006 Operation Iraqi Freedom "Surge", and the current Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) "Surge."
THE IRRELEVANCE OF POPULAR WILL EFFECTS ON NATIONAL WILL
Public opinion in this country is everything.
-Abraham Lincoln

1
The idea of public opinion as the driving voice behind our way of government's expression of national will through the National Military Defense Strategy has been the source of much discussion among scholars and defense officials. National will is often considered to be synonymous with popular will, which in turn is often considered to be synonymous with public opinion. A strong perception exists, particularly within the military, that popular will is fragile. But is this actually the case? And even if the answer is yes, then, in the words of Vice President Dick Cheney, "So?" 2 The 1947 National Security Act established the construct by which military leaders exercise their responsibility to the Nation and the President when providing advice on the use of military force around the globe. The President and his advisors consequently have borne the responsibility of employing the military based on a collective interpretation of our national interests. The ability to sustain our military commitment to defending those national interests has also been a matter of debate since World War II.
Many argue that the Vietnam War was a watershed moment in this debate
between those who believe public opinion and popular will drive our defense policies and those who believe it has little or no impact. Military leaders have been haunted by the fear that popular will is the "Achilles heel" of national security policy. 3 They may fear that a disillusioned public will force the government, and more specifically the President, to limit the employment of the military element of national power and in effect, constrain
America's will to win wars.
It is vital to disentangle the components of national will and especially to reject the notion that it is the same thing as popular will. In the American context, national will may usefully be seen as having two components: popular will, to be sure, but also what might be called the will of the political elite, primarily the President, the National Security
Council, and Congress-with Congress acting as a link to popular will. Public opinion is related to popular will but should not be confused with it. The key questions are first, to what extent does public opinion measure popular will; and second, to what extent does public opinion or popular will actually influence national will? A corollary question, important for the military, is: to what extent does public opinion or popular will influence how we form our national military strategy?
At first glance, public opinion would seem to be a stronger factor than ever with regard to national security policy. The speed of information flow on the Internet and the ability of virtually all Americans to speak their minds through message boards, blogs, and other cybermedia have amplified how Americans voice their opinions, concerns, criticisms and support for and about the President and our elected leaders. But does this influence how our democratically elected officials and our military leaders interpret the collective national will of our nation?
I will describe popular will as a subset of national will and present the actors that represent the "voice" of Americans. The effects of public opinion on national military strategy and policy will be examined through the lenses of the political and military establishment. From this, conclusions will be drawn as to the effect of popular will on the decision to employ military power through the study of the 2006 Operation Iraqi Freedom "Surge", and the current Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) "Surge."
Popular will is represented by voting Americans (constituents), wealthy political campaign contributors, and activist citizens (those who care enough to write, call or otherwise pressure their political leadership). How is popular will exercised within our democracy?
The First Amendment gives Americans the right to free speech and protection from the potentially overwhelming powers of a national government. Political speech is the cornerstone for the First Amendment. This freedom also provides the option of offering financial support to the political and policy forming process, or as professors of history Larry Schweikart and Michael Allen assert, "Money is also equal to free speech." 4 Thus begins the debate on the relevance of public opinion and popular will in the formation of national will and national military strategy. Does public opinion and popular will matter, or should we declare its irrelevance?
With the constituency of our democracy able to voice dissent, provide willing political financial support, and express and disseminate their opinions, Americans are given the opportunity to become an integral part of the political and policymaking process. However, if public opinion is not translated into political action it is largely irrelevant.
Research
In researching this topic I found that perhaps public opinion has somewhat of an impact on aspects of our national security policy decisions. Much of the analysis contains conflicting data and does not conclusively determine that the people of Security Act incorporated the public theory concept of institutional design which established the actors in our bureaucracy and determined their responsibilities and authority. 7 Stuart contends that what made Pearl Harbor unique was that it actually established the concept of national security as the "lodestar" of American foreign policy.
In other words, national security became the predominant factor in building the institutional infrastructure that guided foreign policy. Stuart concluded from these changed circumstances that Washington believed it needed to establish a permanent and influential place for the military at the top of the policymaking community, and that a strong military influence was essential for the development of new modes of thinking
The National Security Act was borne out of necessity to ensure that America would avoid another "Pearl Harbor" type of attack, but more importantly it created the power players within the policymaking process.
about world affairs, based on the concept of national security. 8 "No more Pearl
Harbors" was now understood as a non-negotiable mandate for future policymakers. 9 The role of the military establishment and the authority of the President within the national security policymaking framework would be debated for the next six decades. In 1956, political scientist Gabriel Abraham Almond addressed the Army War College on the problems of public opinion and national security policy. He argued that the highly technical character of the issues, the element of secrecy, and the gravity of the stakes and risks involved created a gap in public competence of foreign policy matters which diminished informal public opinion formation. 10 Almond concludes that only in this way could the strengths of a democratic political process, the interplay of free minds, be introduced into the making of security
In order to create an attentive public competent to handle the issues of national security policy, he recommended four lines of action: 1) the introduction of problems of military policy into university curricula and the development of military scholarship in the universities to produce a leadership with basic competence to understand the issues of security policy; 2) the development of soundly trained military specialists in the media of communication to ensure that the issues of security policy will be rapidly and accurately transmitted throughout the significant strata of the population; 3) the training of specialists in military policy in the major interests groups to ensure more responsible interest group pressures; and 4) the development of scholarship in political and military affairs among the military leadership to create a homogeneous leadership capable of organizing and articulating the issues in public debate.
policy. Without it, we are as vulnerable in the policymaking sphere as the lack of an essential weapons system might make us in the military sphere.
11
Nearly a decade had passed since the creation of National Security Act, and the debate had begun. The recognition that the power elite in Washington, to include the military establishment, were holding all the cards of national security close to their vest in order to prevent future "Pearl Harbors" would become a source of friction in the coming years.
The National Security Act had created a policymaking system that in effect operated with little or no influence from public opinion. Political scientists Daniel Cox,
and Diane Duffin, concluded that prior to the Vietnam War experience the conventional wisdom held that public opinion exerted no influence on U.S. foreign policy decisions.
Scholars working in Vietnam's aftermath found episodic influence of public opinion on foreign policy. 12 But in public memory public opinion is often viewed as the major factor that influenced decisions regarding the conduct of the Vietnam War. Many military officers also assume this to be the case. What many scholars began to reveal was a long-term relationship between public opinion and defense spending. 14 However, Russet found evidence of both public opinion affecting government and government affecting public opinion, but noted that in the years after Vietnam the government responded more strongly to opinion pressure than public opinion responded to governmental pressure. This was demonstrated primarily on military spending decisions over time. 15 If we concede that our political system relies on the power of the people to effect change through the electoral process and that in turn effects military spending, then we must address the demographics of those groups of individuals who support or oppose military force as a matter of foreign policy.
This clearly speaks to sustaining the fight after the decision has been made to project military power, but it does not address the influence of public opinion prior to the decision.
Sociologist Val Burris, a specialist in corporate power structure, right-wing movements, gender inequality, and theories of the middle classes, found that during the Vietnam War support for military action was stronger among men, whites, the more educated, the more affluent, and younger persons. In the post-Vietnam era, men have remained consistently more supportive of military action, despite recent changes in gender roles and gender politics, and racial differences have remained strong. He also states that the gap between whites and non-whites has been most pronounced in periods of intense partisanship or when military events have sparked a "rally-round-theflag" response. This has affected whites more than non-whites. Burris also notes the decline of support for military action by younger persons in the post-Vietnam era. 16 Burris' research found that during the Vietnam War, high-status groups (more educated and more affluent) had a stronger integration into the mainstream political culture, a closer identification with and more susceptible to the appeals of government leaders, and a greater attentiveness to the news media. 17 He concluded that such Public support is the essential, all encompassing glue in strategic planning. It defines the possibilities for achieving strategic objectives. Only when we are willing to sacrifice for our leaders and national interests, and only when our national leaders seriously evaluate this psychosocial element of power, will we have a national strategy worthy of the name. Meuller's to contemplating the effects of public opinion on foreign policy by concluding that the foreign policy opinions of the American public are thoughtful and, when taken into consideration by leaders, are unlikely to derail sound conduct of foreign policy.
These opinions are structured, stable, and they reflect quite closely the objective political circumstances they are meant to reflect. 24 Political scientists Page and Shapiro share a similar belief by stating that public opinion as a collective phenomenon is stable, meaningful and rational. It is able to make distinctions and is organized in coherent patterns based on the best available information and is adaptive to new information. 25 Given this collection of research, we begin to see the scholarly divergence in assessments of public opinion in foreign policy on national security matters. Two things are certain: national security decisions rest on the shoulders of the President and the protection of our democracy and the people of America is paramount to policymaking.
Our electoral system gives power to the people in the form of a vote. Once elected, our leaders will decide if they will adhere to or flaunt public opinion. In matters of foreign policy, as guided by the National Security Act, the President determines when and if we will project military power short of declaring war through Congress.
Public opinion may shape and even influence sustainment of the fight, but as I will attempt to explain, has less impact on the decision to project military power in support of national security.
Public Opinion I believe that public opinion and popular will have little to no impact on implementing and executing National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.
True, many scholars agree that public opinion has been a source of concern and possibly frustration for the power elite in Washington, and the President is ultimately responsible for interpreting public opinion as it relates to our National Security Strategy. in an autocracy, autocracies should win wars more often. They observed the opposite effect, with autocracies tending to fight longer wars on average than democracies, but winning less often. 26 Additionally, the political dimensions of our democracy can shape public opinion in relation to national security strategy and the military. If you accept the premise that public opinion effects national security policy in a democracy, then you must also admit that it may be manipulated by interest groups or politicians in order to garner support for an agenda that may not be supported by the majority of voters. This goes against the fundamental concepts within a democratic government and could be defined as something different than a "pure" democracy. 27 Page and Shapiro contend that much more research is needed in the processes of leadership or manipulation of opinion through the media, political rhetoric and other matters beyond opinion and policy variables within a democracy in order to draw any substantive conclusions about the extent of democratic responsiveness in policy making. 28 Political realists such as Hans Morgenthau, Walter Lippman and George Kennan argue that there is a danger in public opinion forming foreign policy when the thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy in a democracy can be opposed to the "rhetoric and action of the masses". In particular, in a world dominated by power struggles, the public is more likely to be driven by moralism and emotion. This sentiment can be volatile and misguided and will ultimately undermine the reason needed to maintain national interests. 29 Within our democracy it is clear that national security decisions and policies are formed through a series of checks and balances found at the seat of government. In section eight of the Constitution, Congress exercises exclusive legislation and has the power to: declare war, provide for the common defense, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and call forth the militia. 30 The things that matter to Americans may be many, but those issues which make their way to the public forum for debate, and influence voting patterns may make up the key elements of popular will. In other words, if the public is willing to rally behind an issue and form coalitions of support to move their cause forward into the political process, then this becomes popular will. So then, who is responsible for determining and demonstrating America's national will?
National will rests squarely on the shoulders of the President, and he embraces dialogue, division and potential dissent through his advisors, particularly those on National Security Council and within the Department of Defense. 31 Through this dialogue he forms policy and makes decisions that determine national will. He relies on the collective counsel of his cabinet to discuss and formulate decisions which result in the President being the sole arbiter of national will, public opinion, and popular will as it relates to national security matters and in particular military force projection.
This relationship is well exemplified in our first President's approach to foreign policy decision making. Patrick Garrity describes President Washington's actions as acting against the modern dichotomy between "realism" and "idealism" in the formulation of foreign policy. President Washington agreed with both Hamilton (the supposed realist) that nations act solely out of their own interests; and with Jefferson (the supposed idealist) that there is but one standard of morality for men and nations…and even though he dearly hoped America would soon develop its own, distinct national character (which would help liberate it from the enticements of both the French and the English and the divisions the sought to foster) he added the admonition that we required "a decent respect for opinions of mankind."
32
It is within the construct of American democracy that senior military leaders function as advisors to their civilian masters. We should understand the scholarly research that has been developed over time in relation to our national security strategy and decision making process. We cannot accept simple solutions to complicated relationships between the people we serve and protect and the government we represent within the military element of national power. The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people --and it is unacceptable to me. Our troops in Iraq have fought bravely. They have done everything we have asked them to do. Where mistakes have been made, the responsibility rests with me. 33 In his summation he indicated a need for a change in the Iraq strategy based on advice from his national security team, military commanders, diplomats, allies, distinguished outside experts and Congress. The difference maker would be an increase in force levels in order to hold those areas previously cleared of but now regained by terrorists and insurgents. The commitment would be 20,000 additional troops. 
Conclusion
Research supports the argument that public opinion is in the eye of the beholder when it comes to having any significant impact on how the President and the military establishment actually form and execute national security strategy and national military strategy. Morgenthau, Lippman and Kennan agree that there is an inherent danger when incorporating the "rhetoric and action of the masses" in the formulation of foreign policy. This naïve and emotional sentiment can often be misguided and interpreted by policymakers in a manner that may ultimately undermine the reason needed to maintain national interests. 45 Accepting the premise of a cause and effect relationship between public opinion and policymaking in a democracy is also admitting that public opinion can be swayed by special interest groups or politicians for the purpose of supporting hidden or exposed agendas. This could be counter-intuitive to the concept of a "pure" democracy. 46 As
Page and Shapiro admit, much more research is needed in the areas of manipulation of opinion through the media, political rhetoric and other matters beyond opinion and policy variables in order to draw any substantive conclusions about democratic responsiveness in policymaking. 47 Initiating military intervention in support of national security strategy may be viewed differently than sustaining military action over the long term. John Mueller examined public support during times of war and derived three main processes for interpreting public opinion: the tendency of party identifiers to support their party leaders, the tendency of some people to follow the lead of the President no matter who he is, and the tendency of some to act in accordance with belief orientations (hawk or dove). 48 The shadow of Vietnam has long loomed over national security policymakers, and many planners in the military establishment refer to that era as a watershed moment for public opinion and its influence over our political leaders. Daniel Cox and Diane Duffin concluded that the conventional wisdom before the Vietnam War held that public opinion exerted no influence on U.S. foreign policy decisions, and scholars working in Vietnam's aftermath found episodic influence of public opinion on foreign policy. 49 Page and Shapiro contend that what has now become known as the Vietnam Syndrome perhaps has had the greatest impact on those who were young adults during the height of the Vietnam War, and it is possible that the lessons taught by those same people in our schools could have weakened support for the military among younger Americans who were not born at the time of the Vietnam War.
So why does our public memory seem to support the ghost of Vietnam?
50
Although many scholars and professional war fighters still believe that Vietnam accentuates the effect of public opinion on national strategy policymakers, the study of
